The (im)possibility of prudence: population ethics for person-stages
Economics and Philosophy · 2026-11 · 42 (3) · 523-553
DOI: 10.1017/s0266267125100643 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economics and Philosophy, online erschienen am 28.11.2025. Verfasst von Marina Moreno. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 68 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Themen: Ethik in der Pflege
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper develops a parallel between prudence and population ethics. I argue that developing a standard guiding the evaluation of the comparative prudential value of different lives is challenging because it shares a similarity with population ethics: In both contexts, we assess the comparative value of populations of person-stages/people, which may vary in number and level of well-being. Based on this analogy, I show that Arrhenius’ fifth impossibility theorem can be applied to prudence. I develop and compare five possible escape routes: Critical-Level Views, Totalism, Limited Aggregation, Nebel’s Lexical Threshold View and what I call the Negative Lexicality View.
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APA
Moreno, M. (2026). The (im)possibility of prudence: population ethics for person-stages. Economics and Philosophy, 42(3), 523-553. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267125100643
Vancouver
Moreno M. The (im)possibility of prudence: population ethics for person-stages. Economics and Philosophy. 2026;42(3):523-553. doi:10.1017/s0266267125100643
BibTeX
@article{Moreno2026,
author = {Moreno, Marina},
title = {The (im)possibility of prudence: population ethics for person-stages},
journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {42},
number = {3},
pages = {523--553},
doi = {10.1017/s0266267125100643}
}
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