CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2024-12 · 59 (8) · 3671-3707
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109023001023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, online erschienen am 12.09.2023. Verfasst von Ahmed Elnahas und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.
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APA
Elnahas, A., Gao, L., Hossain, M. N., & Kim, J. (2024). CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 59(8), 3671-3707. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109023001023
Vancouver
Elnahas A, Gao L, Hossain MN, Kim J. CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2024;59(8):3671-3707. doi:10.1017/s0022109023001023
BibTeX
@article{Elnahas2024,
author = {Elnahas, Ahmed and Gao, Lei and Hossain, Md Noman and Kim, Jeong-Bon},
title = {CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure},
journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
year = {2024},
volume = {59},
number = {8},
pages = {3671--3707},
doi = {10.1017/s0022109023001023}
}
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