Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2024-06 · 59 (4) · 1586-1619
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109023000340 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, online erschienen am 22.03.2023. Verfasst von Chenxing Jing und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 95-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 101 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Exploiting two quasi-natural experiments, we find that firms increase emissions of toxic pollution following decreases in analyst coverage. The effects are stronger for firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, and firms subject to less stringent monitoring by environmental regulators. Decreases in environmental-related questions raised in conference calls, an increased cost of monitoring to institutional shareholders, reductions in pollution abatement investment, and the weakening of internal governance related to environmental performance are channels through which reduced analyst coverage contributes to increases in firm pollution. Our study highlights the monitoring role analysts play in shaping corporate environmental policies.
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APA
Jing, C., Keasey, K., Lim, I., & Xu, B. (2024). Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 59(4), 1586-1619. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109023000340
Vancouver
Jing C, Keasey K, Lim I, Xu B. Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2024;59(4):1586-1619. doi:10.1017/s0022109023000340
BibTeX
@article{Jing2024,
author = {Jing, Chenxing and Keasey, Kevin and Lim, Ivan and Xu, Bin},
title = {Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies},
journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
year = {2024},
volume = {59},
number = {4},
pages = {1586--1619},
doi = {10.1017/s0022109023000340}
}
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