Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890
The Journal of Economic History · 2026-06 · 86 (2) · 537-570
DOI: 10.1017/s0022050725101034 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Economic History, online erschienen am 30.04.2026. Verfasst von Vincent Bignon und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We provide empirical evidence that central banks can mitigate economic crises more efficiently when they extend eligibility for their discount facility to any safe asset or solvent agent. Nineteenth-century France serves as a case study to circumvent endogeneity. Following 1863, an agricultural pandemic increased defaults outside agriculture. We exploit specificities of the discount window to create exogenous variation in central bank access. Regressions show that while the demand shock brought about by the pandemic led to an increase in defaults outside agriculture by 20 percent, this effect was significantly reduced whenever a branch office of the central bank was present.
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APA
Bignon, V., & Jobst, C. (2026). Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890. The Journal of Economic History, 86(2), 537-570. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050725101034
Vancouver
Bignon V, Jobst C. Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890. The Journal of Economic History. 2026;86(2):537-570. doi:10.1017/s0022050725101034
BibTeX
@article{Bignon2026,
author = {Bignon, Vincent and Jobst, Clemens},
title = {Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890},
journal = {The Journal of Economic History},
year = {2026},
volume = {86},
number = {2},
pages = {537--570},
doi = {10.1017/s0022050725101034}
}
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