The Form of Truth in Spinoza’s Geometrical Method: Deduction, Axioms, and Definitions
Dialogue · 15.06.2026 · 1-13
DOI: 10.1017/s0012217326101085 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Dialogue, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von José Colombo. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article argues that Spinoza’s conception of truth as an intrinsically structured deductive system justifies the geometrical method of the Ethics . Three aspects of the method he develops for forming clear and distinct ideas — its deductive character, its reliance on self-evident starting points functionally analogous to axioms, and its use of definitions as guides to essences — converge with the constitutive features of the mos geometricus . Against externalist readings and beyond existing internalist accounts, these three aspects form a unified system explaining why the Ethics requires a deductive order, undemonstrated starting points, and definitions alongside axioms.
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APA
Colombo, J. (2026). The Form of Truth in Spinoza’s Geometrical Method: Deduction, Axioms, and Definitions. Dialogue, 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217326101085
Vancouver
Colombo J. The Form of Truth in Spinoza’s Geometrical Method: Deduction, Axioms, and Definitions. Dialogue. 2026:1-13. doi:10.1017/s0012217326101085
BibTeX
@article{Colombo2026,
author = {Colombo, José},
title = {The Form of Truth in Spinoza’s Geometrical Method: Deduction, Axioms, and Definitions},
journal = {Dialogue},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--13},
doi = {10.1017/s0012217326101085}
}
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