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Open Access · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

How patronage communicates: information campaigns and government responsiveness in China

Haemin Jee, Kaiping Chen

Political Science Research and Methods · 06.08.2026 · 1-22

DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2026.10112 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Science Research and Methods, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Haemin Jee und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 75 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

How do social relationships among government officials shape information flows within bureaucratic hierarchies? Classic principal–agent theories emphasize information asymmetries as a source of inefficiency, yet we know far less about the actual nature of communication within bureaucracies. We argue that patron–client ties embedded within formal hierarchies play a central role in structuring internal information flows. Lower-level officials with patronage ties to higher-level leaders have incentives to conduct informal information campaigns that signal diligence and competence as a way to compete for political favors. Using newly assembled data from China—including a rare corpus of internal emails between city-level patrons and county-level clients, as well as original datasets on county governments’ public responses to citizen complaints—we find that client counties communicate more frequently with higher-level officials, more often highlight their diligence in addressing complaints, and more actively defend themselves against accusations. However, client and non-client counties perform similarly in how they respond publicly to citizen complaints. These findings reveal how patronage relations can increase upward information flows without impacting public-facing performance. More broadly, these results suggest that communication in nondemocratic settings may serve to strengthen informal political ties.

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APA

Jee, H., & Chen, K. (2026). How patronage communicates: information campaigns and government responsiveness in China. Political Science Research and Methods, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2026.10112

Vancouver

Jee H, Chen K. How patronage communicates: information campaigns and government responsiveness in China. Political Science Research and Methods. 2026:1-22. doi:10.1017/psrm.2026.10112

BibTeX
@article{Jee2026,
  author = {Jee, Haemin and Chen, Kaiping},
  title = {How patronage communicates: information campaigns and government responsiveness in China},
  journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--22},
  doi = {10.1017/psrm.2026.10112}
}
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