A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups
Political Science Research and Methods · 16.07.2026 · 1-18
DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2026.10110 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Science Research and Methods, online erschienen am 16.07.2026. Verfasst von Ilayda B. Onder. Die Arbeit nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study develops a principal–agent theory of why armed groups engage in high-end cooperation involving training or intelligence. While such cooperation enhances capacity, it generates downstream risks. Principals mitigate these risks by selecting agents who are skill-wise complementary but politically non-substitutable. Agents accept high-end support when doing so does not leave them politically overshadowed by a dominant actor. Using original network data on 53 groups in Northeast India (1981–2021) and temporal exponential random graph models, I show that high-end cooperation is more likely in dyads characterized by organizational capacity differentials, complementary attack portfolios, and distinct constituencies. The findings recast militant alliances as products of competitive threat perception and carry broader implications for the study of multiparty conflicts.
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APA
Onder, I. B. (2026). A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups. Political Science Research and Methods, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2026.10110
Vancouver
Onder IB. A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups. Political Science Research and Methods. 2026:1-18. doi:10.1017/psrm.2026.10110
BibTeX
@article{Onder2026,
author = {Onder, Ilayda B.},
title = {A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups},
journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--18},
doi = {10.1017/psrm.2026.10110}
}
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