Passage in the B-Theory
Philosophy of Science · 09.11.2026 · 1-21
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10310 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 09.11.2026. Verfasst von Sam Baron und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A-theoretic conceptions of time hold that there is mind-independent passage. Recently, some B-theorists have joined them in holding that time really passes. These B-theorists diverge from A-theorists in holding that time passes in a way that does not involve commitment to a tensed picture of reality. Certain B-theorists of this type base temporal passage on relations of causal connectability, definable in spacetime. We argue that in this causal conception, calculating the rate of passage has strange results: The rate is variable, undefined, arbitrary, or zero. We argue that this presents a challenge for such B-theories.
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APA
Baron, S., & Nelson, R. (2026). Passage in the B-Theory. Philosophy of Science, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10310
Vancouver
Baron S, Nelson R. Passage in the B-Theory. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-21. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10310
BibTeX
@article{Baron2026,
author = {Baron, Sam and Nelson, Reba},
title = {Passage in the B-Theory},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--21},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10310}
}
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