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Passage in the B-Theory

Sam Baron, Reba Nelson

Philosophy of Science · 09.11.2026 · 1-21

DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10310 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 09.11.2026. Verfasst von Sam Baron und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A-theoretic conceptions of time hold that there is mind-independent passage. Recently, some B-theorists have joined them in holding that time really passes. These B-theorists diverge from A-theorists in holding that time passes in a way that does not involve commitment to a tensed picture of reality. Certain B-theorists of this type base temporal passage on relations of causal connectability, definable in spacetime. We argue that in this causal conception, calculating the rate of passage has strange results: The rate is variable, undefined, arbitrary, or zero. We argue that this presents a challenge for such B-theories.

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APA

Baron, S., & Nelson, R. (2026). Passage in the B-Theory. Philosophy of Science, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10310

Vancouver

Baron S, Nelson R. Passage in the B-Theory. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-21. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10310

BibTeX
@article{Baron2026,
  author = {Baron, Sam and Nelson, Reba},
  title = {Passage in the B-Theory},
  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--21},
  doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10310}
}
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