An ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” approach to mental health
Philosophy of Science · 30.07.2026 · 1-14
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10269 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 30.07.2026. Verfasst von Justin Garson und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Over the past 50 years, psychological research has examined the stigma associated with “biomedical” models of mental illness. Credited with reducing blameworthiness, such models are also linked to negative outcomes such as prognostic pessimism and the desire for social distance. We argue that this research is hindered by an ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” framing, which conflates two ideas: a dysfunction-centered framing and a biogenic framing. We disentangle these concepts and highlight evidence that the dysfunction component of the biomedical framing, rather than the biogenic component, drives the observed negative outcomes. We discuss implications for research and practice.
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APA
Garson, J., Kneeland, E., & Schroder, H. (2026). An ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” approach to mental health. Philosophy of Science, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10269
Vancouver
Garson J, Kneeland E, Schroder H. An ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” approach to mental health. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-14. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10269
BibTeX
@article{Garson2026,
author = {Garson, Justin and Kneeland, Elizabeth and Schroder, Hans},
title = {An ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” approach to mental health},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--14},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10269}
}
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