What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?
Philosophy of Science · 28.07.2026 · 1-18
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10268 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 28.07.2026. Verfasst von Corey Dethier.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Recently, Hasok Chang has argued that we should adopt a pragmatic account of truth on which truth is constituted by practical success. Central to his argument is the claim that truth in this sense can be pursued and that other senses of truth can’t be. In this paper, I present a dilemma for Chang’s view. Either practical success constitutes truth in a way that implies infallibility—a conclusion that I’ll argue is untenable—or the argument from pursuit fails. I end by suggesting that scientific realism alone commits us to very little with respect to truth.
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APA
Dethier, C. (2026). What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?. Philosophy of Science, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10268
Vancouver
Dethier C. What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-18. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10268
BibTeX
@article{Dethier2026,
author = {Dethier, Corey},
title = {What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--18},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10268}
}
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