Against epistemic transparency of algorithms
Philosophy of Science · 06.07.2026 · 1-11
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10246 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 06.07.2026. Verfasst von Juan Manuel Durán. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Epistemic transparency is often proposed as a solution to algorithmic opacity, wherein revealing the inner logic of an algorithm provides reasons or supporting evidence for the justification of its outputs. I argue that transparency is defective in belief formation and thus inadequate as an epistemology of algorithms. Two objections are developed: transparency regress and bootstrapping , both rooted in transparency’s status as a time-sliced, “outsourced” inferentialist epistemology. While weaker forms—such as contextual transparency—are briefly considered, the central argument remains that transparency fails to provide justification and should be abandoned as an epistemology of algorithms.
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APA
Durán, J. M. (2026). Against epistemic transparency of algorithms. Philosophy of Science, 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10246
Vancouver
Durán JM. Against epistemic transparency of algorithms. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-11. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10246
BibTeX
@article{Durn2026,
author = {Durán, Juan Manuel},
title = {Against epistemic transparency of algorithms},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--11},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10246}
}
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