Expertise-Objections to the Argument from Inductive Risk
Philosophy of Science · 22.05.2026 · 1-23
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2026.10223 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 22.05.2026. Verfasst von Monte Cairns. Die Arbeit nennt 74 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article distinguishes and critically evaluates a distinctive class of objection to the Argument from Inductive Risk. “Expertise-objections” question the fitness of scientists to engage in moral decision making during research, on grounds of deficiencies in scientists’ relative expertise. Such critiques bring considerations of inductive risk into important dialogue with wider literature from moral philosophy; but, once contextualized therein, it becomes apparent that expertise-objections fail to decisively prohibit the articulation of moral duties for scientists.
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APA
Cairns, M. (2026). Expertise-Objections to the Argument from Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science, 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2026.10223
Vancouver
Cairns M. Expertise-Objections to the Argument from Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science. 2026:1-23. doi:10.1017/psa.2026.10223
BibTeX
@article{Cairns2026,
author = {Cairns, Monte},
title = {Expertise-Objections to the Argument from Inductive Risk},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--23},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2026.10223}
}
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