How Theory-Laden Are Observations of Black Holes?
Philosophy of Science · 2025-10 · 92 (4) · 827-849
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2025.13 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 10.03.2025. Verfasst von Juliusz Doboszewski und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We evaluate the roles general relativistic assumptions play in simulations used in recent observations of black holes including with LIGO-Virgo and the Event Horizon Telescope. In both experiments, simulations play an ampliative role, enabling the extraction of more information from the data than would be possible otherwise. This comes at a cost of theory-ladenness. We discuss the issue of inferential circularity, which arises in some applications; classify some of the epistemic strategies used to reduce the extent of theory-ladenness; and discuss ways in which these strategies are model independent.
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APA
Doboszewski, J., & Elder, J. (2025). How Theory-Laden Are Observations of Black Holes?. Philosophy of Science, 92(4), 827-849. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2025.13
Vancouver
Doboszewski J, Elder J. How Theory-Laden Are Observations of Black Holes?. Philosophy of Science. 2025;92(4):827-849. doi:10.1017/psa.2025.13
BibTeX
@article{Doboszewski2025,
author = {Doboszewski, Juliusz and Elder, Jamee},
title = {How Theory-Laden Are Observations of Black Holes?},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2025},
volume = {92},
number = {4},
pages = {827--849},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2025.13}
}
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