To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification
Philosophy of Science · 2024-10 · 91 (4) · 990-1008
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2024.17 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 07.05.2024. Verfasst von Zina B. Ward und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz has argued—unconvincingly, we think—that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this article, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons.
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APA
Ward, Z. B., & Creel, K. A. (2024). To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification. Philosophy of Science, 91(4), 990-1008. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.17
Vancouver
Ward ZB, Creel KA. To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification. Philosophy of Science. 2024;91(4):990-1008. doi:10.1017/psa.2024.17
BibTeX
@article{Ward2024,
author = {Ward, Zina B. and Creel, Kathleen A.},
title = {To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {91},
number = {4},
pages = {990--1008},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2024.17}
}
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