Causal Agnosticism About Race: Variable Selection Problems in Causal Inference
Philosophy of Science · 2024-12 · 91 (5) · 1098-1108
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.166 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 16.02.2024. Verfasst von Alexander Williams Tolbert. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper proposes a novel view in the the philosophy of race & causation literature known as “causal agnosticism” about race. Causal agnosticism about race implies that it is reasonable to refrain from making judgments about whether race is a cause. The paper’s thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met to infer that something is a cause, according to the fundamental assumptions of causal inference. However, in the case of race, these conditions are often violated. By advocating for causal agnosticism, the paper suggests a more modest approach to understanding the role of race in causal relationships.
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APA
Tolbert, A. W. (2024). Causal Agnosticism About Race: Variable Selection Problems in Causal Inference. Philosophy of Science, 91(5), 1098-1108. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.166
Vancouver
Tolbert AW. Causal Agnosticism About Race: Variable Selection Problems in Causal Inference. Philosophy of Science. 2024;91(5):1098-1108. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.166
BibTeX
@article{Tolbert2024,
author = {Tolbert, Alexander Williams},
title = {Causal Agnosticism About Race: Variable Selection Problems in Causal Inference},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {91},
number = {5},
pages = {1098--1108},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.166}
}
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