Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences
Philosophy of Science · 2024-12 · 91 (5) · 1068-1077
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.165 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 04.12.2023. Verfasst von Lauren N. Ross. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation.
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APA
Ross, L. N. (2024). Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science, 91(5), 1068-1077. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.165
Vancouver
Ross LN. Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science. 2024;91(5):1068-1077. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.165
BibTeX
@article{Ross2024,
author = {Ross, Lauren N.},
title = {Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {91},
number = {5},
pages = {1068--1077},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.165}
}
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