How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values Versus Polarization and Marginalization
Philosophy of Science · 2024-12 · 91 (5) · 1128-1138
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.119 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 21.09.2023. Verfasst von Soazig Le Bihan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that, whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Because the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.
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APA
Bihan, S. L. (2024). How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values Versus Polarization and Marginalization. Philosophy of Science, 91(5), 1128-1138. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.119
Vancouver
Bihan SL. How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values Versus Polarization and Marginalization. Philosophy of Science. 2024;91(5):1128-1138. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.119
BibTeX
@article{Bihan2024,
author = {Bihan, Soazig Le},
title = {How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values Versus Polarization and Marginalization},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {91},
number = {5},
pages = {1128--1138},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.119}
}
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