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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach

Ori Hacohen

Philosophy of Science · 2022-10 · 89 (4) · 701-720

DOI: 10.1017/psa.2022.6 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 11.02.2022. Verfasst von Ori Hacohen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations (CFA), which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that “to be a representation of X” amounts to “having the function of tracking X,” but maintains that the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins’s account. Thus, CFA offers a notion of neural representation that is dependent on explanatory context. I argue that CFA can account for the normativity of neural representations, and defend its dependence on explanations.

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APA

Hacohen, O. (2022). What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach. Philosophy of Science, 89(4), 701-720. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.6

Vancouver

Hacohen O. What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach. Philosophy of Science. 2022;89(4):701-720. doi:10.1017/psa.2022.6

BibTeX
@article{Hacohen2022,
  author = {Hacohen, Ori},
  title = {What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach},
  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {89},
  number = {4},
  pages = {701--720},
  doi = {10.1017/psa.2022.6}
}
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