Backward Causation: Harder Than It Looks
Philosophy of Science · 2023-01 · 90 (1) · 77-91
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2022.14 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of Science, online erschienen am 22.04.2022. Verfasst von Athamos Stradis. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to David Albert, there are certain situations where we can cause events that lie in our past. In response to a well-known objection that we never observe backward causation, he argues that there are good reasons why we can’t tell when it obtains. However, I identify another difficulty with Albert’s view: at face value, it has the unattractive consequence that backward causation is not just possible, but rife. In this article, I show how this implication can be blocked. I then use my analysis to defend Albert’s account from a second well-known objection, namely, that it allows us to control the past.
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APA
Stradis, A. (2023). Backward Causation: Harder Than It Looks. Philosophy of Science, 90(1), 77-91. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.14
Vancouver
Stradis A. Backward Causation: Harder Than It Looks. Philosophy of Science. 2023;90(1):77-91. doi:10.1017/psa.2022.14
BibTeX
@article{Stradis2023,
author = {Stradis, Athamos},
title = {Backward Causation: Harder Than It Looks},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {90},
number = {1},
pages = {77--91},
doi = {10.1017/psa.2022.14}
}
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