On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions
Journal of Law and Courts · 2023
DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.7 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law and Courts, 2023. Verfasst von Daniel Lempert. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A longstanding debate in American judicial politics concerns whether the US Supreme Court anticipates or responds to the possibility that Congress will override its decisions. A recent theory proposes that opinions that are relatively hard to read are more costly for Congress to review, and that as a result, the Court can decrease the likelihood of override from a hostile Congress by obfuscating its opinions (i.e., writing opinions that are less readable when congressional review is a threat). I derive a straightforward but novel empirical implication of this theory; I then show that the implication does not in fact hold. This casts serious doubt on the claim that justices strategically obfuscate opinion language to avoid congressional override. I also discuss sentence tokenization as a source of measurement error in readability statistics for judicial opinions.
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APA
Lempert, D. (2023). On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions. Journal of Law and Courts. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.7
Vancouver
Lempert D. On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions. Journal of Law and Courts. 2023. doi:10.1017/jlc.2022.7
BibTeX
@article{Lempert2023,
author = {Lempert, Daniel},
title = {On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions},
journal = {Journal of Law and Courts},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.1017/jlc.2022.7}
}
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