The Politics of Interim Judicial Appointments
Journal of Law and Courts · 2023-10 · 11 (2) · 350-369
DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.15 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law and Courts, online erschienen am 06.01.2023. Verfasst von Richard L. Vining und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We evaluate the politics of interim judicial appointments at the state level. Although nominating commissions have been established to promote merit-based selection, we argue that governor-applicant ideological concordance and financial support for a governor’s campaigns increase one’s odds of being appointed. We focus on the impact of political factors, as well as the qualifications of prospective judges. We analyze over 4,000 applications to fill interim judicial vacancies in Georgia from 1991 to 2014. Our findings indicate that ideological proximity and campaign donations to the governor increased the likelihood of appointment to the bench with their influence overpowering some indicators of competence.
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APA
Vining, R. L., Bullock, C. S., & Boldt, E. D. (2023). The Politics of Interim Judicial Appointments. Journal of Law and Courts, 11(2), 350-369. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.15
Vancouver
Vining RL, Bullock CS, Boldt ED. The Politics of Interim Judicial Appointments. Journal of Law and Courts. 2023;11(2):350-369. doi:10.1017/jlc.2022.15
BibTeX
@article{Vining2023,
author = {Vining, Richard L. and Bullock, Charles S. and Boldt, Ethan D.},
title = {The Politics of Interim Judicial Appointments},
journal = {Journal of Law and Courts},
year = {2023},
volume = {11},
number = {2},
pages = {350--369},
doi = {10.1017/jlc.2022.15}
}
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