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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Accountability for Court Packing

Michael J. Nelson, Amanda Driscoll

Journal of Law and Courts · 2023

DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.14 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law and Courts, 2023. Verfasst von Michael J. Nelson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

How does the public respond to court-packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public’s outcry or use court-packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy’s shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.

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APA

Nelson, M. J., & Driscoll, A. (2023). Accountability for Court Packing. Journal of Law and Courts. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.14

Vancouver

Nelson MJ, Driscoll A. Accountability for Court Packing. Journal of Law and Courts. 2023. doi:10.1017/jlc.2022.14

BibTeX
@article{Nelson2023,
  author = {Nelson, Michael J. and Driscoll, Amanda},
  title = {Accountability for Court Packing},
  journal = {Journal of Law and Courts},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1017/jlc.2022.14}
}
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