Bureaucrats and Budgets in South Korea: Evidence for Hometown Favoritism
Journal of East Asian Studies · 2023-07 · 23 (2) · 205-239
DOI: 10.1017/jea.2022.33 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of East Asian Studies, online erschienen am 19.01.2023. Verfasst von Hoyong Jung. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article presents evidence that high-ranking public officials in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance in South Korea affect local budget allocation. Applying a regression model on a uniquely constructed panel dataset, I found that the growth rate of the per-capita National Subsidy, which is a subcomponent of the national budget susceptible to discretionary behaviors, increases approximately 7 percent in the hometowns of high-ranking bureaucrats. To validate these findings and address causality, I conducted a battery of auxiliary robustness checks, which yielded confirmatory results. This study also found that enhancing transparency in the budget allocation system can alleviate concerns about bureaucratic hometown favoritism, providing suggestive evidence of bureaucrats’ rent-seeking behaviors without government transparency.
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APA
Jung, H. (2023). Bureaucrats and Budgets in South Korea: Evidence for Hometown Favoritism. Journal of East Asian Studies, 23(2), 205-239. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.33
Vancouver
Jung H. Bureaucrats and Budgets in South Korea: Evidence for Hometown Favoritism. Journal of East Asian Studies. 2023;23(2):205-239. doi:10.1017/jea.2022.33
BibTeX
@article{Jung2023,
author = {Jung, Hoyong},
title = {Bureaucrats and Budgets in South Korea: Evidence for Hometown Favoritism},
journal = {Journal of East Asian Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {23},
number = {2},
pages = {205--239},
doi = {10.1017/jea.2022.33}
}
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