Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism
Hegel Bulletin · 2021-12 · 42 (3) · 368-394
DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2017.29 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Hegel Bulletin, online erschienen am 04.03.2018. Verfasst von Franz Knappik. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Natural Kind Essentialism (NKE) is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’s arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum.
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APA
Knappik, F. (2021). Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism. Hegel Bulletin, 42(3), 368-394. https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2017.29
Vancouver
Knappik F. Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism. Hegel Bulletin. 2021;42(3):368-394. doi:10.1017/hgl.2017.29
BibTeX
@article{Knappik2021,
author = {Knappik, Franz},
title = {Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism},
journal = {Hegel Bulletin},
year = {2021},
volume = {42},
number = {3},
pages = {368--394},
doi = {10.1017/hgl.2017.29}
}
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