Taylor, Transcendental Arguments, and Hegel on Consciousness
Hegel Bulletin · 2013
DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2013.3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Hegel Bulletin, 2013. Verfasst von Robert Stern. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I consider Charles Taylor's classic article ‘The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology ’, in which Taylor presents an account of the Consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology as a transcendental argument. I set Taylor's discussion in context and present its main themes. I then consider a recent objection to Taylor's approach put forward by Stephen Houlgate: namely, that to see Hegel as using transcendental arguments would be to violate Hegel's requirement that his method in the Phenomenology needs to be presuppositionless . I concede that Houlgate's criticism of Taylor has some force, but argue that nonetheless Taylor can suggest instead that although Hegel is not offering transcendental arguments here, he can plausibly be read as making transcendental claims , so that perhaps Houlgate and Taylor are not so far apart after all, notwithstanding this disagreement.
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APA
Stern, R. (2013). Taylor, Transcendental Arguments, and Hegel on Consciousness. Hegel Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2013.3
Vancouver
Stern R. Taylor, Transcendental Arguments, and Hegel on Consciousness. Hegel Bulletin. 2013. doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.3
BibTeX
@article{Stern2013,
author = {Stern, Robert},
title = {Taylor, Transcendental Arguments, and Hegel on Consciousness},
journal = {Hegel Bulletin},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1017/hgl.2013.3}
}
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