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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The Inescapability of Concept-Application: Why Mischaracterization Defenses Fail

Quanhua Liu

Episteme · 20.07.2026 · 1-14

DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10128 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 20.07.2026. Verfasst von Quanhua Liu. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Sękowski attempts to defend the Method of Cases against the negative experimental philosophy challenge by distinguishing general conceptual judgments (intuitions of intension) from case-application judgments (intuitions of extension). By conceding that case-application judgments are unreliable, Sękowski argues that thought experiments can survive if their grounding premises rely exclusively on general conceptual judgments. Using Sękowski as a primary case study to evaluate the broader family of “mischaracterization” defenses, I contend that this strategy is incomplete. I demonstrate that case-application judgments inescapably appear in the evaluative setup of thought experiments – notably in the justification premise of Gettier’s ten-coins vignette. Plausible attempts to replace these case-sensitive setup premises with general epistemological principles (such as standard evidentialism, process reliabilism, and their revised forms) either leave the case-dependency intact, render the necessary bridging premises false, or beg the question. Furthermore, recent appeals to conceptual engineering and methodological infinitism cannot bypass this dependency, as concept-revision logically supervenes on concept-application. Hence, case-application judgments remain inescapable, and mischaracterization style defenses cannot fully neutralize the Xphi challenge. I close by outlining several implications for epistemological practice, given this dependency in Gettier-style cases.

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APA

Liu, Q. (2026). The Inescapability of Concept-Application: Why Mischaracterization Defenses Fail. Episteme, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10128

Vancouver

Liu Q. The Inescapability of Concept-Application: Why Mischaracterization Defenses Fail. Episteme. 2026:1-14. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10128

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Quanhua},
  title = {The Inescapability of Concept-Application: Why Mischaracterization Defenses Fail},
  journal = {Episteme},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--14},
  doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10128}
}
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