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Doxastic Wronging and the Problem of Evil

Michael Scott, Slater Simek

Episteme · 11.06.2026 · 1-16

DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10123 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von Michael Scott und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 72 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

According to recent accounts of doxastic wronging, we can morally wrong others by the beliefs that we form about them. This paper shows that the case for doxastic wronging yields a novel moral argument both against beliefs about evil prevalent in theistic responses to the problem of evil, as well as against theistic beliefs that posit the existence of a morally perfect God. The moral risks incurred by these beliefs generate an additional epistemic argument against them. Various responses to these arguments are considered – denying doxastic wronging altogether, rejecting moral encroachment, or adopting a nondoxastic theory of religious commitments – and are found to be either unsuccessful in meeting both the moral and epistemic objections and/or to face several significant challenges of their own. The paper contends that the risk of doxastic wronging makes belief in a morally perfect God and beliefs instrumental in responses to the problem of evil more difficult to epistemically justify than previously thought.

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APA

Scott, M., & Simek, S. (2026). Doxastic Wronging and the Problem of Evil. Episteme, 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10123

Vancouver

Scott M, Simek S. Doxastic Wronging and the Problem of Evil. Episteme. 2026:1-16. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10123

BibTeX
@article{Scott2026,
  author = {Scott, Michael and Simek, Slater},
  title = {Doxastic Wronging and the Problem of Evil},
  journal = {Episteme},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--16},
  doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10123}
}
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