Being in a Position to Know without Being Obligated to Believe
Episteme · 05.05.2026 · 1-10
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10116 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 05.05.2026. Verfasst von Thomas Kroedel. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I argue against certain positive epistemic norms, that is, norms that state sufficient conditions for being obligated to believe something. In particular, I argue against positive epistemic norms where the sufficient conditions involve being in a position to know. Such norms face two kinds of problems: they make demands that exceed our cognitive capacity, and they yield obligations and permissions to believe that seem irrational.
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APA
Kroedel, T. (2026). Being in a Position to Know without Being Obligated to Believe. Episteme, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10116
Vancouver
Kroedel T. Being in a Position to Know without Being Obligated to Believe. Episteme. 2026:1-10. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10116
BibTeX
@article{Kroedel2026,
author = {Kroedel, Thomas},
title = {Being in a Position to Know without Being Obligated to Believe},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--10},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10116}
}
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