Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology
Episteme · 06.04.2026 · 1-15
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10110 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 06.04.2026. Verfasst von Patrick Fleming. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Moral disagreement is often taken to undermine claims of moral knowledge. Here, I try to show this widely held view is not true of all moral disagreements. Imagine you encounter MJ. MJ is devoted to excellence in basketball, and he excels at it in a way very few ever have. However, this single-minded pursuit blinds him to other considerations. He is indifferent to larger moral issues and expresses toxic masculinity in his interactions with others. He demeans and degrades others to win basketball games. Suppose you know that, even in ideal conditions, you would not agree on how to live. You have incompatible values. However, you do not think MJ is a fool or evil. You find his achievements to be inspiring. He has his faults but leads a good life. Now, imagine that MJ becomes familiar with your life. He is puzzled by your obsession with philosophy and thinks you are too morally sensitive. Nevertheless, he finds something to appreciate in your life. A person you admire with different fundamental values admires you. As long as you accept that there are better and worse ways of moral thinking, you can accept this moral epistemology regardless of your moral metaphysics.
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APA
Fleming, P. (2026). Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology. Episteme, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10110
Vancouver
Fleming P. Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology. Episteme. 2026:1-15. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10110
BibTeX
@article{Fleming2026,
author = {Fleming, Patrick},
title = {Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--15},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10110}
}
EUVIMED