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A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections

Tomas Bogardus, Will Perrin

Episteme · 2025-03 · 22 (1) · 35-46

DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.42 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 04.09.2023. Verfasst von Tomas Bogardus und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it's true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge.

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APA

Bogardus, T., & Perrin, W. (2025). A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections. Episteme, 22(1), 35-46. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.42

Vancouver

Bogardus T, Perrin W. A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections. Episteme. 2025;22(1):35-46. doi:10.1017/epi.2023.42

BibTeX
@article{Bogardus2025,
  author = {Bogardus, Tomas and Perrin, Will},
  title = {A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections},
  journal = {Episteme},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {22},
  number = {1},
  pages = {35--46},
  doi = {10.1017/epi.2023.42}
}
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