Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True
Episteme · 2022-06 · 19 (2) · 178-196
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.18 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 15.06.2020. Verfasst von Tomas Bogardus und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 63 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong (i.e. safety), or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false (i.e. sensitivity). Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true . We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge.
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APA
Bogardus, T., & Perrin, W. (2022). Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True. Episteme, 19(2), 178-196. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.18
Vancouver
Bogardus T, Perrin W. Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True. Episteme. 2022;19(2):178-196. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.18
BibTeX
@article{Bogardus2022,
author = {Bogardus, Tomas and Perrin, Will},
title = {Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2022},
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {178--196},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2020.18}
}
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