Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief
Episteme · 2022-03 · 19 (1) · 130-145
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.15 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 24.06.2020. Verfasst von K. Merrick Olivier. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief.
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APA
Olivier, K. M. (2022). Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief. Episteme, 19(1), 130-145. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.15
Vancouver
Olivier KM. Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief. Episteme. 2022;19(1):130-145. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.15
BibTeX
@article{Olivier2022,
author = {Olivier, K. Merrick},
title = {Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2022},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {130--145},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2020.15}
}
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