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Coordination in the network minimum game

Johannes C. Hoelzemann, Hongyi Li

Experimental Economics · 27.07.2026 · 1-20

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2026.10055 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Johannes C. Hoelzemann und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Motivated by the problem of organizational design, we study coordination in the network minimum game : a version of the minimum-effort game where players are connected by a directed network. We show experimentally that acyclic networks such as hierarchies are most conducive to successful coordination. Introducing a single link to complete a network cycle may drastically inhibit coordination. Furthermore, acyclic networks enable resilient coordination: initial coordination failure is often overcome (exacerbated) after repeated play in acyclic (cyclic) networks.

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APA

Hoelzemann, J. C., & Li, H. (2026). Coordination in the network minimum game. Experimental Economics, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10055

Vancouver

Hoelzemann JC, Li H. Coordination in the network minimum game. Experimental Economics. 2026:1-20. doi:10.1017/eec.2026.10055

BibTeX
@article{Hoelzemann2026,
  author = {Hoelzemann, Johannes C. and Li, Hongyi},
  title = {Coordination in the network minimum game},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--20},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2026.10055}
}
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