Public information and coordination with a divided majority
Experimental Economics · 2025-11 · 28 (6) · 1300-1320
DOI: 10.1017/eec.2026.10051 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 04.06.2026. Verfasst von Caleb A. Cox und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Groups often agree that change is needed, but differing preferences and information may still lead to difficulty coordinating on a particular alternative. In a laboratory experiment, we study coordination and information aggregation in a divided-majority voting game with public information and conflicting preferences. Voters observe private signals and a public signal about whether alternative upper A $A$ A or upper B $B$ B is socially optimal. Unless sufficiently many voters agree, an inferior default upper C $C$ C occurs. When the public signal is more accurate than the private signal and voters have common preferences, most voters coordinate on the public signal. However, when public-signal accuracy is reduced or preferences conflict, voters follow the public signal less frequently. While reduced public-signal accuracy substantially increases the frequency of coordination failure, conflicting preferences between subgroups do not. These results highlight the importance of accurate public information in achieving collective action.
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APA
Cox, C. A., Oliveira, A. D., & Stoddard, B. (2025). Public information and coordination with a divided majority. Experimental Economics, 28(6), 1300-1320. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10051
Vancouver
Cox CA, Oliveira AD, Stoddard B. Public information and coordination with a divided majority. Experimental Economics. 2025;28(6):1300-1320. doi:10.1017/eec.2026.10051
BibTeX
@article{Cox2025,
author = {Cox, Caleb A. and Oliveira, Angela de and Stoddard, Brock},
title = {Public information and coordination with a divided majority},
journal = {Experimental Economics},
year = {2025},
volume = {28},
number = {6},
pages = {1300--1320},
doi = {10.1017/eec.2026.10051}
}
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