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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Money talks? How different incentive schemes influence prosocial behavior in economic games

Lina Koppel, Amanda M. Lindkvist, Gustav Tinghög

Experimental Economics · 22.04.2026 · 1-21

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2026.10044 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 22.04.2026. Verfasst von Lina Koppel und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The use of real monetary incentives has long defined experimental economics, setting it apart from disciplines like psychology, where hypothetical choices are common. While full-payment and hypothetical designs represent two clear extremes, random-payment incentive schemes – where one of several decisions is randomly selected for payment – have become a prominent approach in economics. Yet the behavioral validity of random-payment schemes remains underexamined: Do they more closely resemble fully incentivized tasks or hypothetical ones? We compare full-payment (participants paid for every decision), no-payment (participants not paid for any decision), and random-payment (participants paid for one randomly selected decision) incentive schemes, using five standard economic games to measure social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, Public Goods Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma). Results from Experiment 1 (n = 1,501), with £1 stakes, indicate no significant differences between incentive schemes in any of the games included or a composite measure of prosocial behavior. In Experiment 2 (n = 750), with £10 stakes, results were largely in line with Experiment 1, suggesting no consistent behavioral impact of incentive schemes at increased stakes. The one notable exception was responder behavior in the Ultimatum Game, where participants in the full-payment condition were less likely to reject offers compared to those in the no-payment condition, with random-payment falling in between. Our results challenge the rigid disciplinary norm that real stakes are essential for valid measurement and invite a more nuanced consideration of how and when different incentive schemes are necessary or appropriate in behavioral research.

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APA

Koppel, L., Lindkvist, A. M., & Tinghög, G. (2026). Money talks? How different incentive schemes influence prosocial behavior in economic games. Experimental Economics, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10044

Vancouver

Koppel L, Lindkvist AM, Tinghög G. Money talks? How different incentive schemes influence prosocial behavior in economic games. Experimental Economics. 2026:1-21. doi:10.1017/eec.2026.10044

BibTeX
@article{Koppel2026,
  author = {Koppel, Lina and Lindkvist, Amanda M. and Tinghög, Gustav},
  title = {Money talks? How different incentive schemes influence prosocial behavior in economic games},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--21},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2026.10044}
}
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