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Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation

Andreas C. Drichoutis, Marco A. Palma, Paul J. Feldman

Experimental Economics · 23.03.2026 · 1-17

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2026.10042 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 23.03.2026. Verfasst von Andreas C. Drichoutis und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Theoretical insights dominate the literature examining the incentive compatibility of payment mechanisms. Despite their elegance, theoretical insights are rarely empirically validated. We fill this gap by empirically exploring the effects of frequently used payment mechanisms using a collective sample of over 3000 participants across two experiments. In Experiment 1, we obtained offer prices to sell a card, systematically varying between-subjects the way subjects received payments over repeated rounds, by either paying for all decisions (and various modifications) or just one, as well as making the payments certain, probabilistic, or purely hypothetical. While we find that the magnitude of the induced value and the range of the prices used to draw a random price significantly affect misbidding behavior, neither the payment mechanism nor the certainty of payment affected misbidding. In Experiment 2, we replaced the BDM mechanism with a Second Price-Auction and found similar results, albeit lower rates of misbidding behavior. Overall, our empirical exercise shows that theoretically relevant elements do not produce empirical differences, while design choices that are theoretically irrelevant produce empirical differences. As such, payment mechanism design considerations should carefully consider the choice architecture in addition to incentive compatibility.

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APA

Drichoutis, A. C., Palma, M. A., & Feldman, P. J. (2026). Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation. Experimental Economics, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10042

Vancouver

Drichoutis AC, Palma MA, Feldman PJ. Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation. Experimental Economics. 2026:1-17. doi:10.1017/eec.2026.10042

BibTeX
@article{Drichoutis2026,
  author = {Drichoutis, Andreas C. and Palma, Marco A. and Feldman, Paul J.},
  title = {Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--17},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2026.10042}
}
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