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Reciprocity in multiple principals – one agent interactions: experimental evidence

Jan Schmitz

Experimental Economics · 2025-09 · 28 (5) · 1064-1084

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2025.10039 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Jan Schmitz. Die Arbeit nennt 79 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Agents frequently engage with multiple principals simultaneously – for example, when borrowing from several banks or peers. In such settings, principals typically possess less information about the agent’s ability or intentions (e.g., to repay a loan) and must rely on trust. This paper presents experimental evidence from trust games framed in a credit market context to examine the role of reciprocity in interactions involving multiple principals (lenders) and a single agent (borrower). Agents were asked to decide whether to act trustworthily and repay, or to default and act selfishly, after receiving the same credit amount from either one or multiple principals. The results show that reciprocity declines when the number of trusting principals increases. A key mechanism appears to be the reduced marginal harm that an agent’s default imposes on each individual principal. Additionally, agents seem less sensitive to the negative consequences of their actions when multiple principals are affected. These findings suggest that interactions involving multiple principals are behaviorally riskier than bilateral ones. The results have implications for the design of incentive structures in multi-principal-agent environments, such as crowdlending platforms.

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APA

Schmitz, J. (2025). Reciprocity in multiple principals – one agent interactions: experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 28(5), 1064-1084. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2025.10039

Vancouver

Schmitz J. Reciprocity in multiple principals – one agent interactions: experimental evidence. Experimental Economics. 2025;28(5):1064-1084. doi:10.1017/eec.2025.10039

BibTeX
@article{Schmitz2025,
  author = {Schmitz, Jan},
  title = {Reciprocity in multiple principals – one agent interactions: experimental evidence},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1064--1084},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2025.10039}
}
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