Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market
Journal of Demographic Economics · 2026-09 · 92 (3) · 376-410
DOI: 10.1017/dem.2025.10011 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Demographic Economics, online erschienen am 24.11.2025. Verfasst von Keisuke Kawata und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 87 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects: First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or negative assortative manner regarding only-child status. We find that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the matching premium or penalty as the difference in partners’ socioeconomic status between only-child and non-only-child individuals, where socioeconomic status is approximated by years of schooling. Our estimates indicate that among women who marry an only-child husband, only children are penalized, as their partners’ educational attainment is 0.63 years lower. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty in light of our empirical findings.
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APA
Kawata, K., & Komura, M. (2026). Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market. Journal of Demographic Economics, 92(3), 376-410. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2025.10011
Vancouver
Kawata K, Komura M. Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market. Journal of Demographic Economics. 2026;92(3):376-410. doi:10.1017/dem.2025.10011
BibTeX
@article{Kawata2026,
author = {Kawata, Keisuke and Komura, Mizuki},
title = {Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market},
journal = {Journal of Demographic Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {92},
number = {3},
pages = {376--410},
doi = {10.1017/dem.2025.10011}
}
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