Why Obligations can’t be Relational All the Way Down
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56
DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10099 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 07.08.2026. Verfasst von Stephen Darwall. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There is a straightforward conceptual distinction between “relational” and “nonrelational” obligations (obligations that are not conceived in explicitly relational terms). 1 Unlike nonrelational obligations, it is intrinsic to relational obligations that they are owed to others. In addition to the person subject to the obligation, the obligor , there is also an obligee (or obligees) to whom the obligation is owed. With nonrelational obligations, there need only be an obligor; no obligee is required. Similarly, when a nonrelational obligation is violated, something wrong has been done. When, however, the violated obligation is relational, not only is a ( pro tanto ) wrong done, someone to whom the obligation is owed is wronged.
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APA
Darwall, S. (2026). Why Obligations can’t be Relational All the Way Down. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10099
Vancouver
Darwall S. Why Obligations can’t be Relational All the Way Down. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10099
BibTeX
@article{Darwall2026,
author = {Darwall, Stephen},
title = {Why Obligations can’t be Relational All the Way Down},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10099}
}
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