Trying to Be Moral, Morally
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56
DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10067 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 17.09.2026. Verfasst von Chelsea Rosenthal. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: New York University, Simon Fraser University, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Often, we’re unsure what morality requires, and there’s a debate about whether our moral uncertainty and moral beliefs matter to what we should do. I argue that (1) our moral-epistemic circumstances (our beliefs, credences, and evidence about morality) matter to what we morally ought to do; (2) many objections to this are only problems if we assume all moral norms are sensitive to moral-epistemic circumstances; and (3) we should avoid this with an account incorporating procedural norms that are sensitive to our moral-epistemic circumstances (analogous to legal due process norms) and substantive norms that aren’t (analogous to substantive justice norms).
Förderung
- New York University
- Simon Fraser University
- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Rosenthal, C. (2026). Trying to Be Moral, Morally. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10067
Vancouver
Rosenthal C. Trying to Be Moral, Morally. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10067
BibTeX
@article{Rosenthal2026,
author = {Rosenthal, Chelsea},
title = {Trying to Be Moral, Morally},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10067}
}
EUVIMED