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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem

Michael Veber

Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56

DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10062 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 07.04.2026. Verfasst von Michael Veber. Die Arbeit nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The paradox of dogmatism is an argument to the effect that any subject who knows that P can thereby know that any counterevidence is misleading and, therefore, the subject ought to ignore that counterevidence. Regulative epistemology is the effort to develop principles to guide inquiry. The paradox of dogmatism is not typically understood as a regulative problem. But that is an illuminating way to view it. Understood that way, this paper offers a solution grounded in an epistemic policy of “following the argument wherever it leads.”

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APA

Veber, M. (2026). The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10062

Vancouver

Veber M. The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10062

BibTeX
@article{Veber2026,
  author = {Veber, Michael},
  title = {The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {56},
  doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10062}
}
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