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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue?

David Christensen

Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56

DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10054 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 09.03.2026. Verfasst von David Christensen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In response to the self-undermining problem for modest accounts of rational belief, some have proposed that an agent may rationally lose confidence in the truth of these accounts, while continuing to believe as the accounts prescribe. Such agents believe akratically. Many reject the possibility of rational akrasia. Others have defended it—at least in cases where an agent rationally sees her own beliefs as more accurate than rational alternatives would be. This paper argues that akrasia can be rational, but that defending rational akrasia based on an agent’s views about accuracy cannot succeed. Fortunately, however, the defense is not necessary.

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APA

Christensen, D. (2026). Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10054

Vancouver

Christensen D. Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10054

BibTeX
@article{Christensen2026,
  author = {Christensen, David},
  title = {Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue?},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {56},
  doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10054}
}
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