Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2023-05 · 53 (4) · 351-365
DOI: 10.1017/can.2024.20 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 03.06.2024. Verfasst von Kengo Miyazono. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”
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APA
Miyazono, K. (2023). Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 53(4), 351-365. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2024.20
Vancouver
Miyazono K. Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2023;53(4):351-365. doi:10.1017/can.2024.20
BibTeX
@article{Miyazono2023,
author = {Miyazono, Kengo},
title = {Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2023},
volume = {53},
number = {4},
pages = {351--365},
doi = {10.1017/can.2024.20}
}
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