EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence

Edmund J. Malesky, Tuan Ngoc Phan, Daniel Yi Xu, T. Robert Fetter

Business and Politics · 25.03.2026 · 1-30

DOI: 10.1017/bap.2026.10023 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Business and Politics, online erschienen am 25.03.2026. Verfasst von Edmund J. Malesky und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Work on the relationship between regulation and bribery suggests that bribes are a joint function of the demands of bureaucrats and the supply of business managers willing to pay them. However, due to biases in measurement, empirical work has concentrated on country-level, demand-side drivers, while research on factors that lead businesses to bribe remains theoretically rich but empirically underdeveloped. We contribute to the burgeoning work on the supply of bribery with a formal model that predicts poorly managed firms may strategically initiate bribes because resource constraints and/or poor service quality necessitate shortcuts in regulatory compliance. To test these theories, we present two connected studies. The first demonstrates that the predictions are consistent with cross-national business survey data. The second, a field experiment, randomly assigned firms to management training courses in Vietnam. Using detailed accounting books, we find that firms in the management course paid monthly bribes less than one-fifth the size ($227 less) of the placebo group, and, consistent with our predictions, had higher levels of regulatory compliance.

Zitieren

APA

Malesky, E. J., Phan, T. N., Xu, D. Y., & Fetter, T. R. (2026). Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence. Business and Politics, 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2026.10023

Vancouver

Malesky EJ, Phan TN, Xu DY, Fetter TR. Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence. Business and Politics. 2026:1-30. doi:10.1017/bap.2026.10023

BibTeX
@article{Malesky2026,
  author = {Malesky, Edmund J. and Phan, Tuan Ngoc and Xu, Daniel Yi and Fetter, T. Robert},
  title = {Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence},
  journal = {Business and Politics},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--30},
  doi = {10.1017/bap.2026.10023}
}
Kostenlos starten →