Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence
Business and Politics · 25.03.2026 · 1-30
DOI: 10.1017/bap.2026.10023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Business and Politics, online erschienen am 25.03.2026. Verfasst von Edmund J. Malesky und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Work on the relationship between regulation and bribery suggests that bribes are a joint function of the demands of bureaucrats and the supply of business managers willing to pay them. However, due to biases in measurement, empirical work has concentrated on country-level, demand-side drivers, while research on factors that lead businesses to bribe remains theoretically rich but empirically underdeveloped. We contribute to the burgeoning work on the supply of bribery with a formal model that predicts poorly managed firms may strategically initiate bribes because resource constraints and/or poor service quality necessitate shortcuts in regulatory compliance. To test these theories, we present two connected studies. The first demonstrates that the predictions are consistent with cross-national business survey data. The second, a field experiment, randomly assigned firms to management training courses in Vietnam. Using detailed accounting books, we find that firms in the management course paid monthly bribes less than one-fifth the size ($227 less) of the placebo group, and, consistent with our predictions, had higher levels of regulatory compliance.
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APA
Malesky, E. J., Phan, T. N., Xu, D. Y., & Fetter, T. R. (2026). Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence. Business and Politics, 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2026.10023
Vancouver
Malesky EJ, Phan TN, Xu DY, Fetter TR. Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence. Business and Politics. 2026:1-30. doi:10.1017/bap.2026.10023
BibTeX
@article{Malesky2026,
author = {Malesky, Edmund J. and Phan, Tuan Ngoc and Xu, Daniel Yi and Fetter, T. Robert},
title = {Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence},
journal = {Business and Politics},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--30},
doi = {10.1017/bap.2026.10023}
}
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