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Climate obstruction and capital accumulation by feigned victimization: TC Energy and the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement

Kyla Tienhaara, Fergus Green

Business and Politics · 2026-06 · 28 (2) · 204-222

DOI: 10.1017/bap.2025.7 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Business and Politics, online erschienen am 14.04.2025. Verfasst von Kyla Tienhaara und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 105 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The international investment regime provides generous protections for foreign investors against adverse legal changes in host states, and unusually strong procedural rights to enforce those protections in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Scholars have observed that the regime enables corporate capital accumulation and raises the costs of climate action, potentially deterring states from adopting ambitious climate policies. Building on this literature, we locate a key source of these concerns in the asymmetric treatment of state and investor behavior in ISDS, which allows investors to depict themselves as innocent victims of “unfair” and “unforeseeable” “political” processes, despite themselves being active political players and sophisticated political risk managers—a tactic we call feigned victimization . This tactic is employed by fossil fuel companies to achieve capital accumulation and climate obstruction goals. We illustrate our argument through an empirical case study of TC Energy’s US$15 billion ISDS claim against the United States in relation to the Biden Administration’s revocation of a permit required to construct the Keystone XL oil pipeline. Our case study also illustrates a method by which states can expose feigned victimization tactics by investors and incorporate evidence of this into their legal defenses in ISDS.

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APA

Tienhaara, K., & Green, F. (2026). Climate obstruction and capital accumulation by feigned victimization: TC Energy and the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement. Business and Politics, 28(2), 204-222. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2025.7

Vancouver

Tienhaara K, Green F. Climate obstruction and capital accumulation by feigned victimization: TC Energy and the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement. Business and Politics. 2026;28(2):204-222. doi:10.1017/bap.2025.7

BibTeX
@article{Tienhaara2026,
  author = {Tienhaara, Kyla and Green, Fergus},
  title = {Climate obstruction and capital accumulation by feigned victimization: TC Energy and the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement},
  journal = {Business and Politics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {2},
  pages = {204--222},
  doi = {10.1017/bap.2025.7}
}
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