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Crossref

OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK

Yichun Chi, Ken Seng Tan

ASTIN Bulletin · 2021-05 · 51 (2) · 661-688

DOI: 10.1017/asb.2021.7 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ASTIN Bulletin, online erschienen am 29.03.2021. Verfasst von Yichun Chi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 27-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this paper, the optimal insurance design is studied from the perspective of an insured, who faces an insurable risk and a background risk. For the reduction of ex post moral hazard, alternative insurance contracts are asked to satisfy the principle of indemnity and the incentive-compatible condition. As in the literature, it is assumed that the insurer calculates the insurance premium solely on the basis of the expected indemnity. When the insured has a general mean-variance preference, an explicit form of optimal insurance is derived explicitly. It is found that the stochastic dependence between the background risk and the insurable risk plays a critical role in the insured’s risk transfer decision. In addition, the optimal insurance policy can often change significantly once the incentive-compatible constraint is removed.

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APA

Chi, Y., & Tan, K. S. (2021). OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK. ASTIN Bulletin, 51(2), 661-688. https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2021.7

Vancouver

Chi Y, Tan KS. OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK. ASTIN Bulletin. 2021;51(2):661-688. doi:10.1017/asb.2021.7

BibTeX
@article{Chi2021,
  author = {Chi, Yichun and Tan, Ken Seng},
  title = {OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK},
  journal = {ASTIN Bulletin},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {661--688},
  doi = {10.1017/asb.2021.7}
}
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