OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK
ASTIN Bulletin · 2021-05 · 51 (2) · 661-688
DOI: 10.1017/asb.2021.7 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ASTIN Bulletin, online erschienen am 29.03.2021. Verfasst von Yichun Chi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 27-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, the optimal insurance design is studied from the perspective of an insured, who faces an insurable risk and a background risk. For the reduction of ex post moral hazard, alternative insurance contracts are asked to satisfy the principle of indemnity and the incentive-compatible condition. As in the literature, it is assumed that the insurer calculates the insurance premium solely on the basis of the expected indemnity. When the insured has a general mean-variance preference, an explicit form of optimal insurance is derived explicitly. It is found that the stochastic dependence between the background risk and the insurable risk plays a critical role in the insured’s risk transfer decision. In addition, the optimal insurance policy can often change significantly once the incentive-compatible constraint is removed.
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APA
Chi, Y., & Tan, K. S. (2021). OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK. ASTIN Bulletin, 51(2), 661-688. https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2021.7
Vancouver
Chi Y, Tan KS. OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK. ASTIN Bulletin. 2021;51(2):661-688. doi:10.1017/asb.2021.7
BibTeX
@article{Chi2021,
author = {Chi, Yichun and Tan, Ken Seng},
title = {OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE INSURANCE WITH BACKGROUND RISK},
journal = {ASTIN Bulletin},
year = {2021},
volume = {51},
number = {2},
pages = {661--688},
doi = {10.1017/asb.2021.7}
}
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