Is Blameworthiness Forever?
Journal of the American Philosophical Association · 2018 · 4 (2) · 204-224
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2018.17 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the American Philosophical Association, online erschienen am 27.11.2018. Verfasst von ANDREW C. KHOURY und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 23-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that once blameworthy, always blameworthy. They believe that blameworthiness, like diamonds, is forever. In this article, we argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections.
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APA
KHOURY, A. C., & MATHESON, B. (2018). Is Blameworthiness Forever?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(2), 204-224. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.17
Vancouver
KHOURY AC, MATHESON B. Is Blameworthiness Forever?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2018;4(2):204-224. doi:10.1017/apa.2018.17
BibTeX
@article{KHOURY2018,
author = {KHOURY, ANDREW C. and MATHESON, BENJAMIN},
title = {Is Blameworthiness Forever?},
journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
year = {2018},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
pages = {204--224},
doi = {10.1017/apa.2018.17}
}
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