The United States, China, and the OECD—UN Rivalry: Asymmetric Regime Complexity in Global Tax Governance
American Journal of International Law · 2026-07 · 120 (3) · 445-491
DOI: 10.1017/ajil.2026.10178 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal of International Law, online erschienen am 17.07.2026. Verfasst von Rifat Azam. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This Article argues that international tax law has developed the characteristics of an asymmetric regime complex; contests over its normative content are playing out simultaneously in the OECD and in the UN. The OECD provides technical rulemaking capacity, while the UN serves to address claims about legitimacy and equity. Powerful states—especially China and the United States—have been exploiting the overlap between the two institutional arenas to try to press their competing visions for domestic and international tax governance.
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APA
Azam, R. (2026). The United States, China, and the OECD—UN Rivalry: Asymmetric Regime Complexity in Global Tax Governance. American Journal of International Law, 120(3), 445-491. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2026.10178
Vancouver
Azam R. The United States, China, and the OECD—UN Rivalry: Asymmetric Regime Complexity in Global Tax Governance. American Journal of International Law. 2026;120(3):445-491. doi:10.1017/ajil.2026.10178
BibTeX
@article{Azam2026,
author = {Azam, Rifat},
title = {The United States, China, and the OECD—UN Rivalry: Asymmetric Regime Complexity in Global Tax Governance},
journal = {American Journal of International Law},
year = {2026},
volume = {120},
number = {3},
pages = {445--491},
doi = {10.1017/ajil.2026.10178}
}
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