Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 3.0
Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets
World Development · 2023-06 · 166 · 106206
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106206 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift World Development, 2023-06. Verfasst von Dilip Mookherjee und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
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APA
Mookherjee, D., & Nath, A. (2023). Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets. World Development, 166, 106206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106206
Vancouver
Mookherjee D, Nath A. Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets. World Development. 2023;166:106206. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106206
BibTeX
@article{Mookherjee2023,
author = {Mookherjee, Dilip and Nath, Anusha},
title = {Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets},
journal = {World Development},
year = {2023},
volume = {166},
pages = {106206},
doi = {10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106206}
}
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