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The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups

Jorge Peña, Aviad Heifetz, Georg Nöldeke

Theoretical Population Biology · 2024

DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Population Biology, 2024. Verfasst von Jorge Peña und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Toulouse School of Economics, France; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, France; Department of H…. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: French National Research Agency, The Open University of Israel, Max-Planck-Institut für Evolutionäre Anthropologie.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cooperation usually becomes harder to sustain as groups become larger because incentives to shirk increase with the number of potential contributors to collective action. But is this always the case? Here we study a binary-action cooperative dilemma where a public good is provided as long as not more than a given number of players shirk from a costly cooperative task. We find that at the stable polymorphic equilibrium, which exists when the cost of cooperation is low enough, the probability of cooperating increases with group size and reaches a limit of one when the group size tends to infinity. Nevertheless, increasing the group size may increase or decrease the probability that the public good is provided at such an equilibrium, depending on the cost value. We also prove that the expected payoff to individuals at the stable polymorphic equilibrium (i.e., their fitness) decreases with group size. For low enough costs of cooperation, both the probability of provision of the public good and the expected payoff converge to positive values in the limit of large group sizes. However, we also find that the basin of attraction of the stable polymorphic equilibrium is a decreasing function of group size and shrinks to zero in the limit of very large groups. Overall, we demonstrate non-trivial comparative statics with respect to group size in an otherwise simple collective action problem.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryHumansBiological EvolutionProbability

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Collective actionCooperationEvolutionary game theoryGroup sizeReplicator dynamic

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Toulouse School of Economics, France; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, France; Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolution…
  • Department of Management and Economics, Open University of Israel, Israel. Electronic address: aviadhe@openu.ac.il.
  • Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Switzerland. Electronic address: georg.noeldeke@unibas.ch.

Förderung

  • French National Research Agency
  • The Open University of Israel
  • Max-Planck-Institut für Evolutionäre Anthropologie
  • Institute for Advanced Study
  • Universiteit van Amsterdam

Zitieren

APA

Peña, J., Heifetz, A., & Nöldeke, G. (2024). The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups. Theoretical Population Biology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001

Vancouver

Peña J, Heifetz A, Nöldeke G. The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups. Theoretical Population Biology. 2024. doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001

BibTeX
@article{Pea2024,
  author = {Peña, Jorge and Heifetz, Aviad and Nöldeke, Georg},
  title = {The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups},
  journal = {Theoretical Population Biology},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001}
}
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